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THE CALIFORNIA THERAPEUTIC ABORTION ACT:
AN ANALYSIS
In June 1967, the California Legislature enacted a Therapeutic
Abortion Act.' In so doing, California became the third state in the
country within the year to significantly revise abortion legislation
which had remained unchanged, in many cases, for almost a century.2
The states of Colorado3 and North Carolina4 preceded California in
adopting revised abortion measures. Each of these three states re-
lied upon the basic pattern proposed in the Model Penal Code.5 How-
ever, there are significant differences between the various enactments,
which reflect the deep, underlying religious, social, and legal con-
flicts which attend the subject of abortion.
The purpose of this note is to examine the California Therapeutic
Abortion Act in comparison with the recent Colorado and North
Carolina legislation. Desirable modifications will be recommended
for the California Act and for consideration by other states contem-
plating abortion legislation revision.6
The Need for Reform
The necessity for a revision of the California abortion legislation
arose for three reasons: first, the legislation did not control, but
rather fostered illegal action; second, it did not conform to accepted
medical practice, nor social ideology; and third, it was discriminatory
in its effect. Prior to its amendment by The Therapeutic Abortion
Act, section 274 of the California Penal Code made it a felony to per-
form an abortion on a woman for any reason "unless the same is neces-
sary to preserve her life. ' 7 Essentially the same provisions exist in 40
other states.8
1 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25950-54.
2 L. LADER, ABORTION 85-91 (1966) [hereinafter cited as LADER].
3 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-2-50 to -52 (Supp. 1967).
4 N.C. Gr. STAT. § 14-46 (Supp. 1967).
r' MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.2 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
6 The American Medical Association has noted that about 20 states are
considering liberalization of existing abortion laws. The Wall Street Journal,
June 19, 1967, at 14, col. 2.
7 Cal. Stats. 1935, ch. 528, § 1, at 1605.
8 J. BATES & E. ZAWADZKI, CRIMnNAL ABORTION 9 (1964) (Table I). In
addition to the statutes of California, Colorado, and North Carolina, 7 other
states have less stringent requirements. Oregon and Alabama prohibit abor-
tions except to preserve the life or health of the mother. ORE. RLV. STAT. §§
163.060, 677.190(2) (1953); ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 9 (1958). New Mexico pro-
hibits abortion except to save the life of the mother or to prevent serious or
permanent bodily injury to her. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-53 (1953). Mary-
land prohibits abortion except when the physician is "satisfied that the foetus
is dead, or that no other method will secure the safety of the mother." MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 3 (1957). Massachusetts and Pennsylvania require for
violation that the abortion be done "unlawfully." MASS. GEm. LAws ANN. ch.
272, § 19 (1956); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4718 (1963). New Jersey requires
that the abortion be done "maliciously or without lawful justification." N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A: 87-1 (1953). For a collection of all state laws on abortion,
see Sands, The Therapeutic Abortion Act: An Answer to the Opposition,
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 310-12 (1966).
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During the past quarter of a century, there has been a growing
recognition that the limitations of abortion laws were forcing many
women to seek illegal abortions.9 Thus, a woman who had been
raped and was faced with bearing the assailant's child, or a woman
who had contracted German measles during early pregnancy and
was faced with bearing a seriously deformed baby, was afforded no
relief under the existing laws.'0 The enormity of this problem is
reflected in the large number of illegal abortions that are conducted.
While it has been noted that accurate statistics are virtually impos-
sible to obtain in determining the number of criminal abortions,'1 it
has been estimated that 18,000 illegal abortions are induced annually
in California. 1 2 Furthermore, illegal abortions are one of the major
factors in causing maternal deaths. A relatively recent study has
indicated that almost one-third of the maternal deaths in California
are related to illegal abortions.1
3
The medical profession has long recognized that there are medi-
cally justifiable grounds for inducing abortions in addition to that of
saving the woman's life.' 4 It has been reported that licensed physi-
cians have conducted abortions on therapeutic grounds where there
was a risk to the health of the woman or a strong probability of per-
manent damage to the fetus.' 5 And a growing recognition of the
psychological trauma attending pregnancy and childbirth has led to
therapeutic abortions for mentally unstable women to preserve their
mental health.'6 A study of abortion practices of California hospitals
revealed that a significant number of the state's major hospitals had
established therapeutic abortion committees which had authorized
abortions for reasons other than preservation of the mother's life, with
full knowledge that this action was illegal.1
7
9 See F. TAussIG, ABORTION SPONTANEOUS AND INDucED (1936). Taussig
wrote the first definitive study of the problems of abortion law inequity in
1936.
10 LADER 4-9.
11 PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF AMERICA, INC., ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES
50 (M. Calderone ed. 1958) [hereinafter cited as CALDERONE].
12 Hearing on AB 2614 Before California Assembly Interim Comm. on
Criminal Procedure, at 74 (Dec. 17, 18, 1962).
Is Montgomery, Lewis & Hammersby, Maternal Deaths in California,
1957-1962, 100 CAL. MEDAcNE 412, 415 (1964). There has been a general de-
cline in deaths from criminal abortions, probably because of the increased
availability of antibiotics. CALDERONE 68.
14 In 1964, it was reported that a study of 420 therapeutic abortions con-
ducted in 5 major Los Angeles hospitals and 14 hospitals in various eastern
states revealed that 41% were for medical illnesses; 32% were for psychiatric
illnesses of the mother; and 27% were given for fetal involvement. Hearing
on AB 2310 Before California Assembly Interim Comm. on Criminal Proce-
dure, at 34 (Sept. 29, 1964).
15 Kummer & Leavy, Therapeutic Abortion Law Confusion, 195 A.M.A.J.
96, 97 (1966); see MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1959).
16 A survey of therapeutic abortions in 61 California hospitals during
1950 disclosed that approximately 25% were performed for reasons of mental
disease or nervous disorder. Russell, Therapeutic Abortions in California in
1950, 60 WESTERN J. OF SURGERY, OBsTETRICs & GYNECOLOGY 497 (1952).
17 Packer & Gampbell, Therapeutic Abortion: A Problem in Law and
Medicine, 11 STAN. L. REy. 417, 430 (1959).
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Tacit acceptance of this medical practice is evidenced by the al-
most total lack of enforcement of abortion laws when the abortionist
is a reputable physician.18 The courts, too, have recognized the inade-
quacy of this legislation and have occasionally attempted to mitigate
the force of the law by straining its interpretation to protect physi-
cians acting in good faith.19
A leading case illustrating this principle is The King v. Bourne,
20
in which an esteemed English surgeon was prosecuted for terminating
the pregnancy of a 14-year-old girl who had been forcibly raped. Al-
though the law as previously interpreted made an abortion legal only
for the purpose of preserving the life of the mother, the court felt
that such extreme circumstances deserved a more "reasonable" inter-
pretation of the exception:
As I have said, I think that those words ought to be construed
in a reasonable sense, and if the doctor is of the opinion, on reasonable
grounds and with adequate knowledge, that the probable consequence
of the continuance of the pregnancy will be to make the woman a
physical or mental wreck, the jury are quite entitled to take the
view that the doctor who, in these circumstances and in that honest
belief, operates, is operating for the purpose of preserving the life
of the woman.2 ' .
A similar position was taken by a California appellate court in the
case of People v. Ballard.22 The court considered the case of a li-
censed physician with a reputable background who was prosecuted for
violation of section 274 of the Penal Code. In asserting that there
was a presumption favoring the physician's determination that the
abortion was necessary to save the life of the woman, the court said:
Surely, the abortion statute (Penal Code, § 274) does not mean
by the words "unless the same is necessary to preserve her life" that
the peril to life be imminent. It ought to be enough that the dan-
gerous condition "be potentially present, even though its full develop-metmight be delayed to a greater or less extent. Nor was it essen-
tial that the doctor should believe that the death of the patient would
be otherwise certain in order to justify him in affording present
relief."23
The restrictive abortion legislation had its harshest effect on
women in the lower socio-economic groups.24 Women able to afford
the price of a progressive, private hospital were favored by a more
liberal interpretation of the rules governing abortion, while public
hospital patients were confronted by a conservative interpretation of
the law, and were generally denied abortions. 25 Furthermore, women
of means who were unable to obtain a hospital abortion could be rela-
tively confident of obtaining a foreign or a safe non-hospital abortion,
18 E. Scu-R, CRIMES WITHOUT VICTIMS 35-36 (1965).
19 Cases cited notes 20-22 infra.
20 [1939] 1 K.B. 687.
21 Id. at 693-94.
22 167 Cal. App. 2d 803, 335 P.2d 204 (1959).
23 Id. at '814, 335 P.2d at 212.
24 E. ScHUR, CRMES WITHOUT VIcTIMS 21 (1965).
25 Id. An illustration of this inequality is shown by the statistical ex-
tremes of Russell's study, supra note 16, at 497, which found that the highest
abortion rate of 1 in 52 deliveries was in a private California hospital, while
the lowest abortion rate of 1 in 8,196 deliveries was in the Los Angeles County
Hospital.
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while the poor had to resort to self-induced abortions or unsldlled
"midwives."2  A consequence of this inequitable system is revealed
in the abnormally high rate of abortion deaths occuring among minor-
ity groups. Almost 80 percent of all abortion deaths occur among
non-Caucasian women.
27
In spite of the obvious schism between the theory of the law and
reality itself, there has been a general social reluctance to openly con-
front the abortion problem in this country. Nevertheless, within the
last decade an increasing amount of literature has been devoted to the
subject and has generally contributed to the increased public aware-
ness of the need for abortion law reform.28  Confronted by conflict-
ing religious beliefs, the California Abortion Act faced 6 years of ex-
tensive legislative study and debate, and underwent several modifica-
tions before it was finally enacted into law.
29
Therapeutic Abortion Act
The Therapeutic Abortion Act of California has been added to
the Health and Safety Code, and is an exception to the criminal
abortion provisions in section 274 of the Penal Code.30 The Act con-
tains important substantive and procedural provisions, which, for
purposes of analysis, will be considered separately.
Substantive Provisions
The most significant substantive addition to the law made by the
Therapeutic Abortion Act is the increase in conditions under which
an abortion may legally be induced. Under section 25951 of the Cali-
fornia Act, a licensed physician is authorized to perform an abortion
where there is "(1) substantial risk that continuance of the preg-
nancy would gravely impair the physical or mental health of the
mother; [or] (2) the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest."3' Both





28 E.g., ABORTION AD THE LAW (D. Smith ed. 1967); J. BATEs & E.
ZAWADzKI, CRIvMNAL ABORTION (1964); B. DICKENS, ABORTION AND THE LAW
(1966); A. JENIs, LAw FOR THE Ricm (1961); L. LADER, ABORTION (1966);
PLANNED PARENTHOOD FEDERATION OF AmERIcA, INc., ABORTION IN THE UNITED
STATES (M. Calderone ed. 1958); E. SCHUR, CRxVIES WITHOUT VICTIMs (1965);
N. ST. JoHN-STEvAs, THE RIGHT To' LIFE (1964); G. Wn nias, THE SANcr
OF LIFE THE CmnwNAL LAw (1957).
29 For a summary of the legislative history of the Therapeutic Abortion
Act in its previous forms, see Sands, supra note 8, at 286-87.
30 In its amended form, CAL. PEN. CODE § 274 provides:
"Every person who provides, supplies, or administers to any woman,-or
procures any woman to take any medicine, drug, or substancesy or uses or
employs any instrument or other means whatever, with intent thereby to
procure the miscarriage of such woman, except as provided in the Therapeu-
tic Abortion Act, Chapter 11 (commencing with Section 25950) of Division 20
of the Health and Safety Code, is punishable by imprisonment in the state
prison not less than two, nor more than five years."
31 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25951 (c).
32 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-50(4) (a) (Supp. 1967).
33 N.C. GEN. STAT. §' 14-46 (Supp. 1967).
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The addition of a physical health indication 4 as a ground for
therapeutic abortion is a major step in conforming the law to ac-
cepted medical practice. Advancements in medical technology have
eliminated many of the risks attending childbirth which previously
represented serious threats to the health of women who suffer from
some form of physical disability. 5 Notwithstanding these medical
advancements, there remain certain physical conditions which can be
seriously aggravated by childbirth, and for which an abortion is
deemed necessary to conserve the health of the pregnant woman.3 6
Preservation of mental health as a justification for abortion was
also necessary to align the abortion statutes with the current medical
practice. The development of psychiatry has led to an increased
realization that pregnancy and childbirth may be a psychologically
damaging experience to the unstable personality. 7 Furthermore, in
certain cases of unwanted pregnancies, or pregnancies in which there
is a high risk of fetal damage, there may be permanent injury to the
mental health of even a normal individual.38
Unfortunately, however, the effectiveness of the mental health
indication for abortion may be limited by the statutory definition of
"mental health" in section 25954:39
The term "mental health" as used in Section 25951 means mental
illness to the extent that the woman is dangerous to herself or to the
person or property of others or is in need of supervision or re-
straint.
There is no such definition of mental health in the Model Penal Code
nor in the statutes of Colorado or North Carolina. The definition was
incorporated into the California Act "to gain legislative support, in
answer to the fear that 'mental health' by itself would be a catchall
for abortions."40  The language of the section is derived from the
statutory definition of mentally ill persons eligible for judicial com-
mitment to a mental hospital.41
It has been suggested that the probable effect of this statutory
definition will be to perpetuate the inequities of abortion treatment
between socio-economic groups.4 2 Private hospitals will tend to lib-
erally construe the terms of the statute to comply with the psychia-
tric needs of their patients, while the more conservative public hos-
34 As used in this discussion the term "indication" denotes the operative
facts which may justify a therapeutic abortion.
35 Niswander, Medical Abortion Practices in the United States, in ABoR-
Tion AND THE LAw 37, 51 (D. Smith ed. 1967).
36 A partial list of the physical indications still recognized as justifying
abortion includes: cancer of the cervix; severe cardiac disease; severe hyper-
tension; nephritis or kidney disease; breast cancer. LAnER 39.
37 Murdock, Experiences in a Psychiatric Hospital, in THERAPE UT c AaoR-
TION 201 (H. Rosen ed. 1954).
38 Interview with Dr. Bernard J. Diamond, M.D., Assistant Chief of Psy-
chiatry, Mt. Zion Hospital, San Francisco, California, in Berkeley, California,
July 18, 1967.
39 CAL. HEALTn & SAFETY CODE § 25954.
40 Letter from State Senator Anthony C. Beilenson (co-author of the
California Therapeutic Abortion Act) to the author, July 17, 1967, on file in
Hastings Law Journal office.
41 CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE § 5550.
42 Interview with Dr. Bernard J. Diamond, suprd note 38.
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pitals will tend to adhere to the letter of the law and deny abortions
for mental health reasons, except in cases of obvious psychosis.
43
The incorporation of the mental health definition in the California
statute, which would permit this double standard of treatment in
mental health cases, may prove to be an undesirable feature for that
reason
44
Each of the three states has included the offenses of rape and
incest as a grounds for authorizing therapeutic abortions. 45 An abor-
tion after rape or incest can probably be justified as necessary to pre-
serve the mental health of the patient, in view of the psychological
trauma which would attend carrying such a fetus to term.4 6 How-
ever, the statutes adopt a more direct approach by making rape or
incest a nonmedical justification for an abortion, in recognition of
the social policy favoring relief when pregnancy results from these
offenses.
47
Of greater difficulty has been the question of whether or not
similar authorization should be granted in the case of "statutory
rape. '48 The American Law Institute included no provision authoriz-
ing an abortion for statutory rape in its tentative drafts of the Model
Penal Code,49 but in its final Proposed Draft of 1962 it authorized
abortion in the case of a pregnancy resulting from illicit intercourse
with a girl below the age of 18.50 The North Carolina legislation will
apparently provide a therapeutic abortion only for a girl under the
age of 12.51 Girls between the ages of 12 and 16 who might be the
victims of the separate statutory offense of carnal knowledge will not
be afforded abortion relief in the absence of judicial construction
interpreting "rape" in the abortion act to include this offense.
52
In California and Colorado the age of consent in determining
statutory rape is 18.53 However, California has limited the application
of its Therapeutic Abortion Act to girls under the age of 15,5 4 while
43 See text at note 25 supra.
44 Interview with Dr. Bernard J. Diamond, supra note 38.
45 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25951(c); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-
2-50(4) (a) (ii) (Supp. 1967); N.C. GEm. STAT. § 14-46 (Supp. 1967).
46 Interview with Dr. Bernard J. Diamond, supra note 38.
47 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
48 CAL. PEN. CODE § 261 states in part:
"Rape is an act of sexual intercourse, accomplished with a female not
the wife of the perpetrator, under either of the following circumstances:
1. Where the female is under the age of eighteen years ......
49 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
50 MODEL PENAL CODE § -230.3 (2) (Proposed Official Draft, May. 4, 1962).
51 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-46 (Supp. 1967) authorizes a therapeutic abortion
in the case of "rape or incest." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-21 (1953), defines rape,
in part, as "carnally knowing and abusing any female child under the age
of 12 years."
52 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-26 (1953) makes it a felony to carnally know or
abuse a female child over 12 years and under 16 who has never before had
sexual relations.
53 CAL. PEN. CODE § 261; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-25 (1963).
54 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25952 (c) states:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, an abortion shall
be approved on the grounds of a violation of subdivision 1 of section 261 of the
November, 1967] NOTES
Colorado requires that a girl be under the age of 16 in order to qual-
ify for an abortion on grounds of statutory rape.55
This disparity between the age of consent and the age for which
an abortion is justified is illogical. It is unreasonable for a state to
declare girls under the age of 18 legally incapable of consenting to
sexual intercourse but to hold them responsible for their conduct by
denying them an abortion unless under the age of 15 or 16.56 The des-
ignation of the lower age limit in the therapeutic abortion statutes
is arguably a tacit admission by the legislatures that the age for statu-
tory rape is too high in California -and Colorado. 57  Whether or not
this is true, the legal age for aborting statutory rape victims should be
made to correspond with the legal age of -consent.
The California Legislature excluded from the adopted statute a
third indication which would justify a therapeutic abortion. A pro-
vision was rejected which would have permitted a therapeutic abort-
ion when "there is substantial risk that the child would be born with
grave physical or mental defect."5 8  The statutes of both Colorado59
and North Carolina60 include this provision.
Permitting abortions for eugenic reasons constitutes the most
controversial ground for terminating a pregnancy because an abor-
tion on these grounds involves a certain degree of medical speculation
whether or not the child will be born defective. However, certain
conditions occurring during pregnancy are known to cause a relatively
high percentage of serious birth defects. Examples of such condi-
tions are: (1) disease of the mother during pregnancy, such as ru-
bella; (2) harmful drugs taken by the mother during pregnancy,
such as Thalidomide; (3) irradiation to the pelvic region before preg-
nancy is discovered; and (4) evidence of serious genetic defects.6 1
The risk that any child will be born with serious defects as a re-
sult of these factors varies between 20 and 60 percent.
62
Opponents of this rejected' provision have suggested that the
probability of defect is an inadequate justification for terminating the
Penal Code only when the woman at the time of the alleged violation, was
below the age of fifteen years."
55 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-50(4) (a) (Supp. 1967).
56 See Sands, supra note 8, at 300. In the Model Penal Code the age of
consent of 16 years is utilized as the legal age for which an abortion may be
given. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.2 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
57 As to this discrepancy, Senator Beilenson stated: "There is obvious
inconsistency between having statutory rape apply to all girls up to eighteen,
and permit them to have abortions only ulp to fifteen. The undercurrent of
feeling on the matter was that the older girls, who consent to intercourse, are
more responsible for their acts, even though the law still tries to discourage
them from these acts, while there is much greater sympathy for the younger
girls. Again, the final decision on the age limit was political, and necessary
to gain sufficient support." Beilenson letter, supra note 40.
58 1967 CAL. J. SENATE 2220.
59 COLO. RaV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-50(4) (a) (Supp. 1967).
60 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-46 (Supp. 1967).
61 See Niswander, supra note 34, at 45-49.
62 See Guttmacher, The Shrinking Non-Psychiatric Indications for Ther-
apeutic Abortion, in THERAPEUTIC ABORTION 12, 20-21 (H. Rosen ed. 1954);
Ryan, Humane Abortion Laws and the Health Needs of Society, in ABORTION
AN Tm LAw 65 (D. Smith ed. 1967).
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life of a fetus.6 3 However, the social and personal tragedy arising
from the birth of a seriously deformed child is a cogent reason for
interrupting a pregnancy when there is such a probability that serious
defect exists. This argument gains additional weight from the knowl-
edge that the psychological distress created by such a pregnancy can
do permanent damage to the mental health of a woman,64 and that
she would generally be fully capable of bearing a normal child after
a therapeutic abortion, in the absence of genetic defects.65
The exclusion of the fetal defect indication from the California
Act is contrary to the recognized policy and practice of the medical
profession. It can be expected that abortions will continue to be
given for cases of fetal deformity in the progressive private hospitals,
which will justify the operation by a liberal interpretation of the
mental and physical health indications in the existing law.67 Thus,
the most significant effect of omitting abortions for eugenic reasons
will be the continuation of socio-economic discrimination in thera-
peutic abortion practices. 68
The California Abortion Act contains a substantive provision con-
sisting of a 20 week limitation from the time of conception after which
a therpeutic abortion may not be given for any reason. 9 Such a limi-
tation is not found in the statutes of Colorado70 or North Corolina.
The effect of this provision is to extend to the fetus an expanded
legal protection not contemplated in the previous California abortion
legislation.
71
Three reasons may be advanced to explain the inclusion of this
new provision in the California Act. The most obvious explanation
is that it was a politically necessary concession to gain support of
those opposed to the passage of the legislation on religious and moral
grounds. 2 Second, it may be considered a reflection of the develop-
63 Mandy, Reflections of a Gynecologist, in THERAPEUTIc ABORTION 292-93
(H. Rosen ed. 1954).
64 G. WILL AMs, THE SAwcTry or Lia AND THE CRInNAL LAw 174-75
(1957) [hereinafter cited as WILLIAMs]. The draftsmen of the MoDEL PENAL
CODE recognized this, but stated: "The criminal law should speak unambig-
uously on the authority of the physician to act where he believes that con-
tinuance of the pregnancy entails substantial risk that the offspring will be
a physical or mental casualty. The prospective birth of a seriously defective
child may even constitute a threat to the mental health of the apprehensive
mother, but it seems preferable to rest the matter directly on scientific prog-
nostication of the child's state of health rather than on the more uncertain
prediction of the mother's reaction." MoDEL PNAL CODE § 207.11, Comment
(Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
65 Interview with Dr. Bernard J. Diamond, supra note 38.
66 See text at note 17 supra. Senator Beilenson stated the section was
omitted "solely to gain the withdrawal of the Governor's opposition." Beilen-
son letter, supra note 40.
67 See text at note 24 supra.
68 Id.
69 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25953.
70 Colorado did, however, include a 16 week limitation for abortion au-
thorization after rape. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 40-2-50(4) (a) (fi) (Supp. 1967).
71 Cal. Stats. 1935, ch. 528, § 1, at 1605.
72 The Roman Catholic Church and its members presented the most vig-
orous dissenting .voice against reformation of the California abortion laws.
NOTES
ing trend in the law toward recognition of the separate biological
existence of the fetus by affording it legal rights.73 Third, the legis-
lature may have intended to give legal expression to the general atti-
tude of society against the calculated destruction of a fetus in an
advanced state of maturity.74 It is likely that an amalgum of these
reasons, rather than any sole factor, represents the most accurate ex-
planation of the motivation underlying the inclusion of this provision.
This limitation is an apparent attempt to strike a balance be-
tween the statutorily recognized rights of the pregnant mother and
the legal interests of the unborn child. However, it is suggested that
the legislature's 20 week dividing point weighs unreasonably in favor
of the fetus and slights the needs of the mother.
Medical science has established that the fetus does not become
viable, i.e., capable of extra-uterine existence, until sometime between
the 24th and 28th week.75 Therefore, the expulsion of a nonviable
fetus-an abortion-is possible after the 20th week. Notwithstanding
this possibility, under the existing statute, the expulsion of a non-
viable, 20-week-old fetus must be denied a woman regardless of the
circumstances justifying the request. Thus, the very life of the
mother might be jeopardized in favor of a fetus not yet capable of
an independent existence.
A more reasonable balance between the competing interests of the
woman and the fetus would be achieved by utilizing the time of
viability.76 The capacity of the fetus for an independent existence at
that time argues forcefully for affording it greater protection under
the law.
77
Sands, supra note 8, at 293. It is part of Catholic teaching that ensoulment
occurs shortly after conception. Therefore, an abortion at any time is con-
sidered the killing of a human being and murder. WILLimAs 196-97. For a
summary of the position taken by the California Catholic opposition, see
O'Dwyer, Is Therapeutic Abortion Justified?, in Hearing on AB 2614 Before
California Assembly Interim Comm. on Criminal Procedure, at 264 (Dec. 17,
18, 1962). The apparent intent of this provision is to prevent delay which
might hinder proper determination as to probable cause.
73 See, e.g., Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 139 (D.D.C. 1946) (child's right
of action against physician for prenatal injuries sustained during delivery
upheld); Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (1939) (sim-
ilar right of action upheld under a statute); W. PROSSER, TORTS 354-57 (3d. ed.
1964); Byrne, The Legal Rights of the Unborn Child, 41 L.A.B. BULL. 24
(1965); Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 McnH. L. REv. 579 (1965). It has
been noted, however, that, with the exception of wrongful death cases, the
legal rights of the unborn child have been predicated upon its subsequent live
birth. Sands, supra note 8, at 302. See PROSSER, supra at 356.
74 See WiLLiAms 230; MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11, Comment (Tent. Draft
No. 9, 1959).
"As the fetus develops to the point where it is recognizably human in
form (4-6 weeks), or manifests life by movement perceptible to the mother
('quickening': 14-20 weeks), or becomes 'viable', i.e., capable of surviving
though born prematurely (24-28 weeks), it increasingly evokes in the greater
portion of mankind a feeling of sympathy as with a fellow human being, so
that its destruction comes to be regarded by many as morally equivalent to
murder." Id. (footnotes omitted).
75 WLLiAmS 230.
76 Id.
77 The MODEL PENAL CODE recognizes viability as a natural dividing point
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Procedural Provisions
The new abortion legislation incorporates extensive provisions
which establish stringent controls in the administration of therapeu-
tic abortions.
Hospital Administrative Controls
An important innovation provided by each of the three new
abortion acts is that a therapeutic abortion is legal only when per-
formed in an accredited hospital by a licensed physician.78 This is an
obvious improvement over the previous law which made no require-
ment as to how a therapeutic abortion was to be performed.
A second procedural provision is that the decision to induce a
therapeutic abortion is not left to an individual physician whose judg-
ment may be subject to the pressures of personal involvement. In
California and Colorado, hospital committees are vested with the re-
sponsibility of determining whether an abortion is authorized under
the conditions set forth in the statutes. 79 North Carolina requires a
certification by three doctors as to the circumstances justifying an
abortion, but there is no requirement for a determination by a com-
mittee selected from the hospital staff.8 0
The hospital therapeutic abortion committee can be a propitious
device for administering the statute. As an established body with
semistable membership, it has a greater opportunity for objective,
uniform interpretation of the justifiable grounds for abortion.8 '
Membership on a therapeutic abortion committee is also subject
to statutory controls. In California, the committee must consist of
"not less than two licensed physicians and surgeons, and if the pro-
posed termination will occur after the 13th week of pregnancy, the
committee must consist of at least three such licensed physicians and
surgeons.' 18 2 If the committee consists of no more than three licensed
physicians, committee consent must be unanimous.8 3  In Colorado,
the committee must be "three licensed physicians who are members
of the staff of the hospital where the proposed termination would be
performed .... ,,s4
The attending physician is not disqualified from membership on
the committee in the California and Colorado statutes. Therefore, in
by making an illegal abortion after the 26th week a more aggravated offense.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3(1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962); MoDEL PENAL
CODE § 207.11, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
78 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25951; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-50
(4) (a) (Supp. 1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-46 (Supp. 1967).
79 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25950; COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-50 (4) (a)
(Supp. 1967).
so N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-46 (Supp. 1967).
81 Guttmacher, supra note 61, at 15-16.
82 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25953. The rationale behind this increase
to three doctors is that after the first 12 weeks of pregnancy an abortion
usually requires abdominal surgery and is of far greater seriousness. See
Hearing on AB 2614 Before the California Assembly Interim Comm. on
Criminal Procedure at 161 (Dec. 17, 18, 1962).
83 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25951.
84 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-50(5) (Supp. 1967).
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California, it will be legally possible to have the determination for
therapeutic abortion placed in the hands of two licensed physicians,
one of whom may be the patient's attending physician. This reduces
the effectiveness of the committee decision as a control device and
lessens the chance for a uniform and impartial administration of ther-
apeutic abortion practices. It would seem preferable to exclude the
attending physician from taking part in deciding his own cases.85
Special Procedure for Rape or Incest Cases
The California Act contains special procedures for determining
the permissibility of an abortion in rape and incest cases. The hos-
pital committee is required to notify the district attorney of the
county where the alleged rape or incest occurred of the application
and to "transmit [to him] . . . the affidavit of the applicant attesting
to the facts establishing the alleged rape or incest.""6 The committee
cannot authorize an abortion unless the district attorney reports to
the committee that there is "probable cause" to believe a rape or in-
cest did occur; or if it receives no reply from the district attorney
within 5 days, the committee is authorized to approve the abortion.
An adverse finding by the district attorney may be appealed in an
informal hearing before the superior court within 1 week after the
finding of no probable cause.
The Colorado procedure is similar though less extensive.8 7 It
does require that the district attorney where the offense occurred in-
form the committee in writing that there is probable cause to believe
rape or incest has occurred. However, there is no alternative authori-
zation for an abortion in the event of a district attorney's silence, and
there is no procedure for judicial appeal in the face of an adverse
finding by a district attorney.
North Carolina merely requires that the alleged rape be reported
to a law enforcement agency or a court official within 7 days.8 There
is no similar requirement for cases based upon incest.8 9
Since abortion authorization in the case of an alleged rape or in-
cest turns upon the legal determination of probable cause, it is meri-
torious to require the participation of the district attorney in this pro-
cedure. However, the language of these provisions may have created
unforeseen limitations upon the California and Colorado enactments
which will be discussed below.90
Residency
California and Colorado do not include a residency requirement
in their Therapeutic Abortion Acts. On the other hand, North Caro-
lina requires 4 months of residency in the state prior to the abortion,
except in cases "of emergency, where the life of said woman is in
85 See Packer & Gampbell, supra note 17, at 455.
86 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25952.
87 CoLo. REv. STAT. AN. § 40-2-50(4) (a) (Supp. 1967).
88 N.C. GFx. STAT. § 14-46 (Supp. 1967).
89 Id.
90 See text at note 95 infra.
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danger .... 91. The apparent legislative intent underlying the North
Carolina provision is to prevent the state from becoming an "abortion
haven" for nonresidentsf 2 While this measure may be of present im-
portance, the increased trend toward modernization of abortion legis-
lation in all states makes it only a temporary problem.
9 3
In spite of the absence of any express residency requirement in
the legislation of California and Colorado, there appears to be an im-
plicit territorial limitation imposed by the procedural mechanism
governing abortion for rape and incest. The provision in the two
statutes, which requires certification of probable cause by the district
attorney where the offense occurred 94 will probably be construed to
limit abortions for rape and incest to only those offenses which have
occurred within the state.9 5 This would deny relief of therapeutic
abortion to not only the nonresident, but also to a resident who was
in another state when the offense occurred. These situations are likely
to arise in view of the great volume of interstate travel. It is sug-
gested that amendments be enacted to clarify the legislative intent
on this matter.
Consent By Next Of Kin
The final procedural provision to be considered is the form of
consent required by the next of kin of the woman as a prerequisite to
obtaining a therapeutic abortion. The California Act contains no
express requirement for the additional consent by family members
of the woman requesting the abortion. The North Carolina statute
requires the written consent of the woman, and, if. she is a minor or
incompetent, the consent of her parents, guardian, or husband if she
is married.98 The language of the Colorado provision is ambiguous,
97
91 N.C. GE'r. STAT. § 14-46 (Supp. 1967).
92 The Wall Street Journal; Aug. 18, 1967, at 1, col 1.
9 See note 6 supra.
94 See text at note 86 supra.
95 The authors of both the Colorado and California acts agree that such
an interpretation may be given to the present language of the statutes, but
that there was no intention to create such a requirement. Beilenson letter,
supra note 40. Colorado State Representative Richard D. Lamm, author of
the Colorado act, stated:
"It was my intention in drafting the law to have no resident requirement
whatsoever. However, on re-reading the final product of many long weeks
of legislative compromise, I agree that the law is sufficiently ambiguous that
as a conservative lawyer I have recommended to my clients and professional
associates that the category of rape and incest be restricted to Colorado resi-
dents. This is because of the wording in 40-2-50(4) (a) (ii) .which states that
'the district attorney of the judicial district in *which the alleged rape ,or
incest has occurred.' This may be construed by a court in a case brought by
a crusading district attorney to mean a Colorado district attorney by inpli-
cation, consequently, we have advised our doctors to treat only, residents in
this category." Letter to the author, September" 12; 1967, on file in Hastings
Law Journal office.
96 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-46 (Supp. 1967).
97 COLO. REV. STAT. ANw. § 40-2-50(4) (a) (Supp. 1967) states:
"Justified medical termination means the intentional ending of the preg-
nancy of a woman at the request of'said woman or if said woman is under
the age of 18 years, then at the request of said woman and her then living
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but appears to require the consent of her parent or guardian if she is
under 18 years of age, or the consent of her husband if she is married
and living with him, regardless of her age or competency.
Despite the obvious impact of a therapeutic abortion on the family
unit, the California Legislature felt that a requirement of consent of
the husband was unnecessary. The co-author of the Act pointed out9s
that in almost all cases the husband would naturally take part in the
woman's decision to request an abortion. By omitting a requirement
for the husband's consent, the situation is avoided where a medically
necessary abortion might be denied a woman because her husband
was unavailable or had strong religious objections to an abortion.
Parental consent in the case of a minor or incompetent was also
deemed unnecessary since "no hospital will perform surgery on such
persons in California without such consent, and the bill requires all
legal abortions to be done in hospitals." 99
The conclusions reached by the California Legislature as to con-
sent by next of kin appear to be sound, particularly since the fetal
defect indication has been omitted from the legislation. Should the
fetal defect indication ever be incorporated in the California Act, con-
sideration should be given to requiring the husband's participation
in the request for the abortion.1 00
In this case, neither medical necessity nor strong social policy is
present to justify authorizing an abortion without the husband's con-
sent. The economic and psychological consequences associated with
the question of whether or not to interrupt a pregnancy where there
is a substantial risk of serious fetal deformity, would seem to present
a joint burden for both the husband and wife.
Conclusion
The Therapeutic Abortion Act recently enacted in California rep-
resents a necessary change in the law to conform with the developing
needs of society. The expansion of the substantive indications of
therapeutic abortions to include the preservation of physical and
mental health of the woman, is a propitious addition to the law. How-
ever, the omission from the Act of the fetal defect indication, and the
addition of an ambiguous definition of mental health, are defects of
the legislation which may have their greatest effect in perpetuating
discrimination in therapeutic abortion administration along socio-
economic lines. The time of viability of the fetus, rather than the
arbitrary period of 20 weeks, would provide a more natural demarca-
tion for limiting abortions.
The extensive procedural provisions of the Act provide a prac-
ticable framework for controlling the administration of therapeutic
parent or guardian, or if the woman is married and living with her husband,
at the request of said woman and her husband ......
This section could be interpreted also to mean that the husband's partic-
ipation is required only if the woman is under the age of 18.
98 Beilenson letter, supra note 40.
99 Id.
100 See Drinian, The Inviobility of- the Right to be Born, in Aiomiox AxD
Tmr LAw 107, 113 (D. Smith ed. 1967).
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abortions. The requirements that all therapeutic abortions be con-
ducted in accredited hospitals by licensed physicians, and that abor-
tion authorization be made by impartial hospital committees, are
highly desirable measures to ensure uniform application of the law
The failure to disqualify the attending physician from taking part in
the abortion committee decision, however, may weaken the effective-
ness of committee decisions as a control device.
The authorization of therapeutic abortions following rape or in-
cest is sensibly regulated by requiring the participation of the district
attorney However, the procedure for his participation contains im-
plicit territorial limitations which do not appear to have been in-
tended, as is indicated by the omission of a residency requirement.
In addition, limiting therapeutic abortions for statutory rape to an
age below the age of consent is an unreasonable inconsistency which
should be corrected.
The failure to include a parental consent provision in the case
of minors or a requirement that husbands join in the request for an
abortion is not a serious omission from the Califorma Act. But, con-
sideration should be given to such a requirement if a fetal defect in-
dication is later added to the legislation.
While this analysis has shown that the Califorma Therapeutic
Abortion Act is not without defects, they weigh less in the balance
than the positive contribution the legislation affords in the reform of
the antiquated law With the few exceptions that have been noted
in this discussion, the Californa Act provides a useful model for
other legislatures contemplating reform of abortion legislation.
Bran Pendleton*
* Member, Third Year Class.
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